<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>RAWTEXT</title><description>Unfiltered tech analysis. No hype, no PR — just what&apos;s real.</description><link>https://rawtext.io/</link><language>en-us</language><item><title>Anthropic Leaked Its Own Source Code. Twice. In One Week.</title><link>https://rawtext.io/signal/anthropic-leaked-source-code-twice/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://rawtext.io/signal/anthropic-leaked-source-code-twice/</guid><description>Two source code leaks in five days from the company that markets itself as the most safety-conscious AI lab. What most coverage missed.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Let me explain why I&amp;#39;m writing this at all.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I&amp;#39;ve been following Anthropic for a while. Not obsessively, but I work with this stuff, so I keep up. When the first leak dropped — the npm package one — my first thought was: okay, happens. Then came the second one. That&amp;#39;s when I started taking notes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This isn&amp;#39;t a clean investigative report. I&amp;#39;m writing it because it&amp;#39;s been bothering me, and because I can&amp;#39;t shake the feeling that most of the coverage is missing the actual point.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What Happened&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On March 31, 2026, someone at Anthropic forgot to configure a &lt;code&gt;.npmignore&lt;/code&gt; file correctly. The official Claude Code npm package shipped with a source map that exposed the complete, unobfuscated TypeScript source code. Security researcher Chaofan Shou found it. The repository was forked more than 41,500 times within hours. Gone is gone.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That was the second leak in a week. Five days earlier, Fortune had reported that Anthropic accidentally made nearly 3,000 files publicly accessible — including a draft blog post about an internal model they call &amp;quot;Mythos&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Capybara.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two leaks. Five days. One company that has spent years telling the world it&amp;#39;s the most safety-conscious lab in AI.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;The Part That Actually Bothers Me&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;According to a technical breakdown by software engineer Gabriel Anhaia, a single correctly configured &lt;code&gt;.npmignore&lt;/code&gt; file — or a correct &lt;code&gt;files&lt;/code&gt; field in &lt;code&gt;package.json&lt;/code&gt; — would have been enough to prevent all of this. This isn&amp;#39;t some obscure edge case. It&amp;#39;s the first thing covered in every npm release tutorial I&amp;#39;ve ever read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Anthropic&amp;#39;s official response: &amp;quot;This was a release packaging issue caused by human error, not a security breach.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Technically accurate. But &amp;quot;human error&amp;quot; sounds like a company that has already moved on before it fully understood what happened.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What was inside the leak isn&amp;#39;t trivial either. There were dozens of feature flags for capabilities that are fully built but haven&amp;#39;t shipped — including something internally called &amp;quot;KAIROS&amp;quot;: an autonomous daemon mode that lets Claude Code operate as an always-on background agent. There&amp;#39;s a process inside it called &amp;quot;autoDream&amp;quot; that consolidates memory while the user is idle. Anthropic never intended to publish any of that. Every competitor has it now.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;The Timing Nobody Is Talking About&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the early hours of March 31 — simultaneous with the source code leak — there was a supply chain attack on the axios npm package. Axios is a core dependency of Claude Code. Anyone who installed or updated Claude Code between 00:21 and 03:29 UTC may have pulled a trojanized version containing a remote access trojan.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I&amp;#39;m not claiming these are connected. Coincidences happen. But people should know about it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What&amp;#39;s happened since is less ambiguous: the leak is being actively used as a social engineering lure to distribute malicious payloads via GitHub, and there&amp;#39;s typosquatting on internal npm package names — traps set for developers trying to compile the leaked Claude Code source themselves. The original mistake was human. What&amp;#39;s being built on top of it isn&amp;#39;t.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What This Means for Anthropic&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Claude Code is running at an annualized revenue of over $2.5 billion, with enterprise as the dominant channel. These aren&amp;#39;t forgiving hobbyist users — these are CTOs with long procurement checklists.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Anthropic has built its entire positioning on a single promise: we are the adults in the room. We take safety seriously while everyone else chases market share. That was never just marketing. It&amp;#39;s why regulators take their calls, why certain talent chooses them, why enterprise deals close.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And then this happens. Twice. In five days.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Anthropic will survive this. The products are good, and enterprise buyers have short memories when the tool keeps working. But every CTO currently in a procurement decision now has a new question on their list — and Anthropic doesn&amp;#39;t have a good answer for it right now.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The next safety promise is going to cost a little more to sell than the last one. That&amp;#39;s not a dramatic take. It&amp;#39;s just what happens when you stumble twice in a week and your public response amounts to: &amp;quot;Yeah, our mistake, moving on.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I&amp;#39;m not writing this with any satisfaction. I use their products. I want them to be good. But honest criticism shouldn&amp;#39;t have to feel like an attack to be worth saying.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>anthropic</category><category>claude</category><category>security</category><category>source-code-leak</category><category>enterprise</category><category>npm</category></item><item><title>Cursor 3 Rewrites the Rules — Not Everyone Is Convinced</title><link>https://rawtext.io/tools/cursor-3-rewrites-rules-ai-coding/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://rawtext.io/tools/cursor-3-rewrites-rules-ai-coding/</guid><description>Cursor 3 launched on April 2, 2026, marking Anysphere&apos;s boldest bet yet: a full pivot from AI-assisted code editor to agent-first development workspace.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;On April 2, Anysphere shipped Cursor 3 under the internal codename &amp;quot;Glass&amp;quot; — and simultaneously declared the previous version of their product obsolete. That takes confidence. Jonas Nelle, Cursor&amp;#39;s head of engineering, told WIRED: &amp;quot;In the last few months, our profession has completely changed. A lot of the product that got Cursor here is not as important going forward anymore.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;He&amp;#39;s not wrong. The question is whether what replaces it is ready.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What Actually Changed&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Cursor 3 wasn&amp;#39;t updated — it was rebuilt. The traditional VS Code editor remains available, but the default experience is now the Agents Window: a full-screen workspace where you run multiple AI agents in parallel across local machines, cloud sandboxes, SSH environments, and mobile. You dispatch tasks, close your laptop, and come back to a PR with screenshots and a video recording. More than a third of Cursor&amp;#39;s own internal PRs are already authored by agents running in cloud sandboxes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Design Mode lets frontend developers select UI elements directly in the browser and describe changes in natural language. /worktree isolates experiments in git worktrees. /best-of-n runs the same prompt against multiple models simultaneously. The cloud agent infrastructure supports up to 50 workers per team, with Kubernetes and fleet management APIs, and self-hosted enterprise deployment that keeps code, builds, and secrets entirely on-premise.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vision is coherent. Developers as architects, agents as builders. I&amp;#39;ve been using Cursor since before most people had heard of it, and I won&amp;#39;t pretend this isn&amp;#39;t impressive engineering.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;The Model Powering It — and the Transparency Problem&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The engine is Composer 2, launched March 19. The benchmarks are strong: 61.3 on CursorBench-3 (up 39% from Composer 1.5), 73.7 on SWE-bench Multilingual, 61.7 on Terminal-Bench 2.0. Pricing undercuts competitors significantly — $0.50 per million input tokens versus Claude Opus 4.6&amp;#39;s roughly 10x higher rate. 200,000-token context window. A real-time reinforcement learning pipeline that ships improved model checkpoints every five hours based on actual user interactions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Within 24 hours of launch, a developer found the internal model ID: kimi-k2p5-rl-0317-s515-fast. Composer 2 is built on Moonshot AI&amp;#39;s Kimi K2.5, a one-trillion-parameter mixture-of-experts model. Moonshot&amp;#39;s head of pretraining confirmed the tokenizer was &amp;quot;completely identical.&amp;quot; Cursor co-founder Aman Sanger called the omission a &amp;quot;miss.&amp;quot; VP Lee Robinson acknowledged the base but claimed only about a quarter of compute came from Kimi K2.5, with the rest from Cursor&amp;#39;s own training.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here&amp;#39;s what bothers me about this: Cursor is a $50 billion company used by over half the Fortune 500. Kimi K2.5&amp;#39;s modified MIT license explicitly requires prominent display of the Kimi name for products exceeding $20 million in monthly revenue. Cursor surpasses that threshold by roughly 8x. This wasn&amp;#39;t a startup cutting a corner in a garage. This was a deliberate product decision by a company that knows exactly how big it is.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;quot;Developer trust, once cracked, does not heal on the same timeline as a product roadmap.&amp;quot; I didn&amp;#39;t write that line — an analyst did. But I&amp;#39;m keeping it because it&amp;#39;s exactly right.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;The Pricing Conversation Nobody Wants to Have&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Six tiers. Free. Pro at $20/month. Pro+ at $60/month. Ultra at $200/month — 20x usage, effectively $4,000 worth of API capacity. Teams at $40/user/month. Enterprise at custom pricing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reports have surfaced of developers spending up to $2,000 in two days on agent-intensive workflows. I believe it. Several prominent developers told WIRED they shifted to Claude Code or Codex because of more generous usage limits on those subsidized subscriptions. Claude Code reportedly commands 54% of the AI coding market according to Menlo Ventures data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Let&amp;#39;s be direct: the Ultra tier at $200/month exists for developers who need agents running continuously. If you&amp;#39;re using Cursor 3 as Anysphere intends — multiple parallel agents, cloud sandboxes, overnight autonomous tasks — you&amp;#39;re on Ultra. That&amp;#39;s $2,400 a year, before your IDE costs, before your other subscriptions, before anything else.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That&amp;#39;s not inherently wrong. But it means the &amp;quot;agent-first development&amp;quot; vision has a price floor that excludes a significant portion of the developers Cursor is claiming to liberate.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Where It Actually Breaks&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I&amp;#39;ll say this plainly: autonomous agents in complex codebases are not ready to be trusted without rigorous review, and Cursor 3 does not change that.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Cursor handles Rust lifetime annotations correctly about 80% of the time. A 20% failure rate on Rust&amp;#39;s core safety mechanism is not a minor footnote. An engineering team at ilert had to add explicit rule files forbidding AI-generated patterns like holding std::sync::Mutex across .await points — because the agent kept introducing them. Academic research shows ownership and borrowing violations account for over 40% of compilation errors in AI-generated Rust code.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It gets worse at scale. A CodeRabbit analysis of 470 open-source PRs found AI-authored code contained 1.7x more bugs than human-written code, including higher rates of critical issues. An engineer using Claude Code — Cursor&amp;#39;s closest competitor — had an agent destroy a live production environment: network, services, and a database with years of data. Amazon&amp;#39;s own internal documents cited &amp;quot;Gen-AI assisted changes&amp;quot; as a contributing factor in incidents including a December AWS outage. Apiiro found developers using AI introduced roughly 10x more security issues than those who did not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OWASP published its first Top 10 for Agentic Applications in 2026. A December 2025 audit found 30+ vulnerabilities across all major AI IDEs — Cursor, Windsurf, GitHub Copilot, and others — with 24 assigned CVEs. Autonomous agent features can be turned into data exfiltration and remote code execution vectors.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Stack Overflow&amp;#39;s 2026 Developer Survey: 29% of developers trust AI outputs to be accurate. Down 11 points from 2024. The top Hacker News reaction to Cursor 3&amp;#39;s launch: &amp;quot;I wish they&amp;#39;d keep the old philosophy of letting the developer drive and the agent assist… I still want to code, not vibe my way through tickets.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That reaction isn&amp;#39;t nostalgia. It&amp;#39;s signal.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;April 2 Was a Bad Day to Launch Alone&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Cursor 3 shipped on the same day GitHub dropped its Copilot SDK into public preview, Google released Gemma 4 under Apache 2.0 — the first time the Gemma family has been fully open for commercial use — and Google&amp;#39;s Antigravity IDE continued its free public preview. Antigravity, built on a VS Code fork following Google&amp;#39;s $2.4 billion acquisition of Windsurf&amp;#39;s talent, scores 76.2% on SWE-bench Verified — the highest published benchmark for any coding agent currently available.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That&amp;#39;s a crowded week. And Google&amp;#39;s Antigravity is free.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;The Honest Verdict&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Cursor 3 is the most technically sophisticated agent-first IDE available today. The Composer 2 benchmarks are real. The real-time RL pipeline is genuinely novel — a model that improves every five hours based on actual production usage is a different kind of product than anything that existed two years ago. The cloud agent infrastructure and enterprise self-hosting are serious engineering.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I use Cursor. I&amp;#39;ll keep using it. The Tab completions alone justify the Pro subscription for daily work.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But the &amp;quot;agent-first&amp;quot; era will arrive more slowly and unevenly than this launch suggests. The transparency stumble with Kimi K2.5 was avoidable and unnecessary. The $200/month pricing ceiling is real. The trust deficit — 71% of developers who don&amp;#39;t trust AI accuracy — didn&amp;#39;t appear from nowhere. It was earned.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The developers most likely to benefit from Cursor 3 are those working in well-typed, well-tested codebases with clear architectural boundaries. Everyone else should use it as a powerful assistant, not an autonomous colleague.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The question isn&amp;#39;t whether Cursor 3 is impressive. It is. The question is whether &amp;quot;you are the architect, agents are the builders&amp;quot; describes where we actually are — or where Anysphere needs us to believe we are to justify a $50 billion valuation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Those are different questions with different answers.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>cursor</category><category>ai-coding</category><category>ide</category><category>agents</category><category>anysphere</category><category>composer</category><category>developer-tools</category></item></channel></rss>